



VAYIKRA

SORRY, NOT SORRY

The Torah's approach to accountability and healing

PARSHAH OVERVIEW

Vayikra

G-d calls to Moses from the Tent of Meeting and communicates to him the laws of the *korbanot*, the animal and meal offerings brought in the Sanctuary. These include:

1. The “ascending offering” (*olah*) that was wholly raised to G-d by the fire atop the altar;
2. Five varieties of “meal offerings” (*minchah*), prepared with fine flour, olive oil, and frankincense;
3. The “peace offering” (*shelamim*), whose meat was

eaten by the one bringing the offering after parts were burned on the altar and parts were given to the *Kohanim* (Priests);

4. The different types of “sin offering” (*chatat*) brought to atone for transgressions committed erroneously by the High Priest, the entire community, the king, or the ordinary Jew; and

5. The “guilt offering” (*asham*), brought by one who misappropriated property of the Sanctuary, who was in

doubt as to whether they transgressed a Divine prohibition, or who committed a “betrayal against G-d” by swearing falsely to defraud a fellow human.

EXERCISE

What methods do people use today to cope with being hurt by others?

QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION

When someone feels hurt, what strategies or tools are you aware of that people use to process their emotions and move on?



QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION

If people today are so well equipped to move on from being hurt, does that mean you're off the hook if you hurt someone? If they've healed, is it still your responsibility to apologize and make amends?

TEXT 1

Leviticus 5:20–26

כ. וַיְדַבֵּר ה' אֶל מֹשֶׁה לֵאמֹר.

כא. נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִחָטֵּא וּמַעֲלָה מַעַל בֶּה' וְכִחֹשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ בַּפִּקְדוֹן אוֹ בְּתִשׁוּמַת יָד אוֹ בְּגִזְל אוֹ עֲשָׂק אֶת עַמִּיתוֹ.

כב. אוֹ מִצָּא אֲבֵדָה וְכִחֹשׁ בָּהּ וְנִשְׁבַּע עַל שְׁקָר עַל אַחַת מִכָּל אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה הָאָדָם לַחֲטָא בְּהֵנָה.

כג. וְהָיָה כִּי יִחָטֵּא וְאָשָׁם וְהָשִׁיב אֶת הַגִּזְלָה אֲשֶׁר גָּזַל אוֹ אֶת הָעֲשָׂק אֲשֶׁר עֲשָׂק אוֹ אֶת הַפִּקְדוֹן אֲשֶׁר הִפְקִיד אֹתוֹ אוֹ אֶת הָאֲבֵדָה אֲשֶׁר מָצָא.

20. And G-d spoke to Moses, saying:

21. "If a person sins, betraying G-d by falsely denying to his fellow concerning a deposit, or money given in hand, or an object taken by robbery, or he withheld funds from his fellow.

22. "Or he found a lost article and he denied it and swore falsely regarding any one of all these cases whereby a man may sin.

23. "And it shall be, when he has sinned and is guilty, that he shall return the article that he had robbed, or the funds that he had withheld, or the item that had been deposited with him, or the article that he had found.

TEXT 1

Leviticus 5:20–26

כד. או מכל אשר ישבע עליו
לשקר ושלם אתו בראשו
ותמשתיו יסף עליו לאשר הוא לו
יתננו ביום אשמתו.

כה. ואת אשמו יביא לה' איל
תמים מן הצאן בערךך לאשם אל
הכהן.

כו. וכפר עליו הכהן לפני ה'
ונסלח לו על אחת מכל אשר
יעשה לאשמה בה.

24. "Or anything else, regarding which he had sworn falsely, he shall pay it with its principal, adding its fifths to it. He shall give it to its rightful owner on the day he repents for his guilt.

25. "He shall then bring his guilt offering to G-d: an unblemished ram from the flock with the same value, for a guilt offering, to the Kohen.

26. "And the Kohen shall make atonement for him before G-d, and he shall be forgiven for any one of all cases whereby one may commit a sin, incurring guilt through it."

QUESTION ON THE VERSE

Why does the Torah need to state that the money is given to “its rightful owner”? This should be obvious enough to any reader—who else would the thief be returning the money to?

TEXT 2

Rashi, Leviticus 5:24

THE RASHI

"לֹא־נֶשֶׁר הוּא לוֹ". לְמִי נְשֵׁה־מֶמֶן נְשָׁלוּ.

"To its rightful owner." To the rightful owner of the money.

QUESTION ON RASHI

Why does Rashi restate the obvious—the money must be returned to the owner?

TEXT 3A

Talmud, Bava Kama
130a-b

הַגּוֹזֵל אֶת חֵבִירוֹ שְׁוָה
פְּרוּטָה, וְנִשְׁבַּע לוֹ –
יֹלִיכֵנוּ אַחֲרָיו לְמָדִי.
לֹא יִתֵּן לֹא לְבָנוּ, וְלֹא
לְשְׁלוּחוֹ, אֲבָל נוֹתֵן
לְשִׁלִּיחַ בֵּית דִּין. וְאִם מֵת
– יַחְזִיר לְיוֹרְשָׁיו . . .
מֵאִי טַעְמָא? דָּאָמַר קְרָא:
"לְאַשֶׁר הוּא לוֹ, יִתְּנֵנוּ
בְּיוֹם אֲשֶׁמָּתוֹ".

Mishnah: one who robs another of an item worth at least one perutah and takes a false oath to the robbery victim claiming their innocence, and then later wishes to repent, must bring the money to the victim, even if this necessitates chasing them as far as Media.

The robber may not give the payment to the victim's child or agent—but may give the payment to an agent of the court. If the robbery victim has died, the money is returned to their heirs. . . .


Gemara: What is the reason? The verse states, "He shall give it to its rightful owner on the day he repents for his guilt" (Leviticus 5:24).

TEXT 3B

*Rabbi Meir Leibush
Wisser, Leviticus 5:24*

"לאשר הוא לו". באר שישלם לאשר הגזלה
שלו. רצונו לומר לידו, לא ליד שליח.

"To its rightful owner." The verse spells out that the restitution must be made to the owner of the stolen items, meaning that it must be given to the owner directly, not through an agent.



Why did Rashi
simply restate the
obvious, rather than
offer clarification?

ANSWER ON THE VERSE PART A.

Returning the value of the stolen item to the owner is straightforward, but perhaps the added payment should be given to G-d.

TEXT 4

*Rabbi Yaakov Tzvi
Mecklenburg, Haketav
Vehakabbalah,
Leviticus 5:24*

"לאשר הוא לו יתננו". למי
שהממון שלו (רש"י) . . .
אחר שהכתוב אומר "והשיב
ושלם", ולמי ישיב וישלם
זולתי למי שחייב לו עד
שצריך לומר לאשר הוא לו?
ואפשר שסבור הייתי שהקרן
ישלם לבעל חובו והחומש
להקדש כמו הקרבן, אמר
לאשר הוא לו, למי שחייב
לשלם הקרן יתן גם החומש
שהוסיף עליו.

"To its rightful owner." To the rightful owner of the money (Rashi). . . . The verses state that the thief must "return" and "pay." Who, then, should the restitution be made to if not to the victim? Why does the verse need to specify "to its rightful owner"?

I may have thought the principal should be paid to the original owner, but the added fifth should be donated to Divine services, like the sacrifice. The verse therefore states "to its rightful owner," that the added fifth must be paid to the same person who receives the principal.

MONETARY PAYMENTS:

MAMON

- Restitution
- Returning what is owed to owner.



KENAS

- Penalty
- A punishment for the offender.



TEXT 5

*Maimonides,
Mishneh Torah,
Laws of Monetary
Damages 2:8*

זה הכלל: כל המשלם מה שהזיק – הרי זה ממון. וכל המשלם יתר או פחות,
כגון תשלומי כפל או חצי נזק – הרי היתר על הקרן או הפחות קנס.
ואין חייבין קנס אלא על פי עדים, אבל המודה בכל קנס מן הקנסות פטור.

This is the operating principle: Whenever a person pays for damage that they caused, it is considered a monetary obligation. Whenever a person is obligated to pay more or less than the damage caused—as in the case of obligation to pay double the value for theft, or the obligation to pay half of the value for certain forms of damage caused by one's animal—the amount that is greater or less than the principal is considered to be a fine.

A fine is required only when one's obligation to pay is established through the testimony of witnesses. When a person's obligation is based on their own admission, they are absolved of the obligation to pay a fine.

TEXT 6A

*Rabbi Yitzchak Yaakov
Reines, Orim Gedolim,
ch. 4*

בכלל יש שני מיני חיובים הנקובים
בשמותיהן: (א) ממון, (ב) קנס.

והשני חיובים האלה מתבדלים זה
מזה בכמה וכמה פרטי דינים כנודע.
ולפי דרכינו נראה דיסוד שינויי
דיניהם הוא חלוקות המטרות.

הנה בכל חיוב ממון המטרה היא
הקבלה, כי אחרי שחייב לו כסף יש
לו להשיב אליו הכסף שחייב לו.
ועיקר תנועת כובד הפעולה הוא
בהמקבל, כי כפי חוקי המשפט
בהכרח לו להחייב לראות להשיב
אליו כספו.

There are two general categories of
monetary obligatory: (a) payments, and
(b) fines.

As is known, there are a number of legal
implications from this distinction. We can
explain these different laws by defining
the respective purposes of these forms of
payment.

The goal of any “payment” is receipt.
Since the offender owes the victim money,
he or she is obligated to pay it to them.
The payment is focused on the recipient
because the law requires that the offender
return them their money.

TEXT 6A

*Rabbi Yitzchak Yaakov
Reines, Orim Gedolim,
ch. 4*

ואמנם בקנס יסוד הפעולה הוא מצד
הנותן בו מונח כל כובד הפעולה. כי
כפי חוקי התורה ראוי הוא לשאת עליו
עונש זה להוציא מתחת ידו שיעור כסף
זה. וממילא יש לו לשלם הסך הזה
לבעל דין, כמו הגנב שמשלם ד' וה'
להנגנב, הגם דיסוד התשלום כוא
קפידת ההוצאה, בכל זה יש לו לתת
הכסף להנגנב כי גם הוא הבעל דין בזה.

By contrast, payment of a fine is
focused on the giver. The offender is
paying it because Torah law dictates
that they be punished by losing this
amount of money. Although the point
is the offender giving, we are still told
that the money must be given to the
victim because he or she is the other
party to the case.

A *kenas* serves to punish the offender, regardless of who receives the payment.



TEXT 6B

*Rabbi Yitzchak Yaakov
Reines, ibid.*

ואחרי שהם נבדלים זה מזה בשורש
העיקרי הזה, מתבדלים הם גם
בענפיהם בדיניהם ובפרטי
תשלומיהן. בממון אינה מועלת
ההודאה לסלק החיוב, ואדרבה כי
היא גורמת עוד החיוב, כי אם יודה
שהוא חייב לאחד מחוייב לשלם לו,
כי אין שום טעם לומר שיתפטר
בהודאה אחרי דבממון העקר הוא
שהוא מחוייב לתת לו כסף. ואולם
כל עוד שנחסר לנו הידיעה אין
לחייבו, ואמנם מיד שיש על זה
הודאה מהבעל דין בעצמו הוי בירור
גמור שאין למעלה הימנו . . .

This fundamental difference between the categories of “payment” and “fine” accounts for their divergent respective bodies of law. For simple payments, the offender’s confession does not absolve the obligation. There is no reason to say that confession should create a pardon because for payments of restitution, the goal is delivering the money to the victim. The confession actually causes the obligation because we cannot obligate a person to pay without evidence, so as soon as the offender confesses, this is considered the strongest form of evidence, thus triggering the obligation to pay. . . .

TEXT 6B

*Rabbi Yitzchak Yaakov
Reines, ibid.*

אמנם כל זה הוא בממון. אבל בקנס
דעיקר החיוב הוא מצד מטרת הנותן
שיש לו להענש ולהוציא עבור עוונתו
סכום כסף כזה, על כן אמרה התורה כי
חיוב כזה נגמר רק על ידי עדים. דעונש
קנס נגבל ונערך מעט עם שארי עונשים
הבאים על האדם עבור חטאיו ופשעיו,
דההודאה מועלת בהם להתם חטא
ולכלות פשע. וכמו כן בזה, אחרי דהחיוב
אינו מצד המקבל רק מצד הנותן, ועל כן
אחרי דההודאה מועלת להסיר ממנו
העונש ממילא אין לו לתת לחבירו כי כל
עיקר הגעת הכסף אליו היה מצד שזה
האיש היה מחויב ליתן וממילא במקום
שיש להקל ממנו אין עוד שום חיוב.

The above is true only regarding payments of restitution. For fines, however, the focus is on punishing the offender for their offense by making them lose this sum of money. The Torah rules that this obligation can only be imposed based on witness testimony because this is a punishment given to a person on account of their sin, and the confession has the power to atone for the sin. Since the fine exists for the offender's sake rather than the victim's, when the offender confesses and is absolved of punishment, they no longer need to pay the fine. The only reason a victim ever receives a fine is because the offender was required to pay, so by default, the money goes to the victim. But when we are absolving the offender of punishment, there is no longer any need to pay this fine.

TEXT 7

Rashi, Leviticus 5:23

"כִּי יִחַטֵּא וְאָשֵׁם". כְּשִׁיכִיר בְּעֵצְמוֹ לָשׁוּב
בְּתִשּׁוּבָה, וּבִדְעָתוֹ לְהִתְוֹדוֹת כִּי חָטָא וְאָשֵׁם.

"When he has sinned and is guilty." When he recognizes his duty to repent and makes up his mind to confess that he sinned and is guilty.

ANSWER ON THE VERSE PART B.

The Torah specifies “its rightful owner” to clarify that the entire payment goes to the victim, not the Temple, even though the fine serves as atonement.



The reason *why* the offender must give the additional fine is to compensate the victim for lost investment potential.

TEXT 8

*Rabbi Shlomo
Ephraim Luntshitz,
Keli Yakar, Leviticus
5:23*

"וחמשיתיו יוסף עליו". על שהיו
מעותיו בטלים אצלו.

"Adding its fifths to it." For the money
having been idle in the thief's hands.

TEXT 9

*Rabbi Shneur Zalman
of Liadi, Tanya, Igeret
Hakodesh, ch. 25*

אמרו רבותינו זכרונם לברכה:
כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה
זרה וכו'. והטעם מובן ליודעי
בינה.

לפי שבעת כעסו נסתלקה ממנו
האמונה, כי אילו היה מאמין
שמאת ה' היתה זאת לו לא היה
בכעס כלל.

ואף שבן אדם שהוא בעל
בחירה מקללו או מכהו או מזיק
ממונו ומתחייב בדיני אדם
ובדיני שמים על רוע בחירתו.

The sages taught, "A person who gets angry is comparable to an idolater" (Zohar, vol. 1, p. 27b). The reason for this is clear to those who have deep insight:

At the time of his or her anger, faith in G d and in His individual Divine Providence has left them. For were they to believe that what happened to them was G d's doing, they would not be angry at all.

True, it is a person possessed of free choice that is cursing them, or striking them, or causing damage to their property, and the offender is therefore guilty according to the laws of humanity and the laws of Heaven for their evil choice.

TEXT 9

*Rabbi Shneur Zalman
of Liadi, Tanya, Igeret
Hakodesh, ch. 25*

אף על פי כן, על הניזק כבר
נגזר מן השמים והרבה
שלוחים למקום.

ולא עוד, אלא אפילו בשעה
זו ממש שמכהו או מקללו
מתלבש בו כח ה' ורוח פיו
ית' המחיהו ומקיימו.

Nevertheless, as regards the person harmed, this incident was already decreed in Heaven, and G-d has many agents through whom He can act.

Moreover, it's not only that a Heavenly decree gave permission in principle and made it possible for them to suffer injury. Even at that very moment at which the offender strikes or curses them, there is vested in the offender a force from G-d and the breath of His mouth that animates and sustains them.

TWO PERSPECTIVES:

THE VICTIM

- The loss was destined by G-d, meaning they were meant to lose the money.
- They are encouraged to see it as Divine Providence and should not harbor resentment.

THE OFFENDER

- The thief chose to steal and is fully responsible for their actions.
- G-d has many agents—they didn't have to be the one to carry out the crime.
- Punishment is necessary, as their actions were still morally and legally wrong.

QUESTION

If the money was destined to be lost, why must it be returned to the victim rather than given to G-d or charity, especially the additional fine for lost profits?

ANSWER

The victim's loss may be ordained, but it doesn't mean the loss is permanent—if the thief returns the money, it shows that the loss was meant to be **temporary**.

TEXT 10A

*The Rebbe, Rabbi
Menachem Mendel
Schneerson, Likutei
Sichot 7, pp. 15-16*

פון דעם וואס מען האט צוגענומען דאס געלט פון
נגזל איז נאך ניט קיין הוכחה אז אויף אים איז
נגזר געווארן צו פארלירן דאס געלט אויף
שטענדיק. עס קען דאך זיין אז אויף אים איז נגזר
געווארן צו פארלירן דאס געלט נאר אויף א
געוויסער צייט.

דער בירור אין דעם גזר דין אויפן נגזל - צי ער
זאל פארלירן דאס געלט אויף שטענדיק, אדער
בלויז אויף א משך זמן, וועט מען ערשט וויסן
דערפון גופא: וועט דער גזלן אים אומקערן די
גזילה, וועט עס זיין א באווייז אז דער גזר דין איז
געווען צו ליידן דעם היזק בלויז צייטווייליק.
וועט ער אים די גזילה ניט אומקערן (און אויך
ניט דורך אנדערע, ווארום "הרבה שלוחים
למקום") וועט מען דאן וויסן אז די גזירה איז ער
זאל פארלירן דאס געלט אויף שטענדיק.

The fact that the money was taken away from the victim does not prove that they were destined to lose the money forever. It is possible that G-d decreed that they would lose the money only for a certain amount of time.

We will only be able to determine if the decree was forever or only temporary from the events that unfold: if the thief returns the money, this will prove that the decree was only temporary, and if the thief doesn't return the money, we will then know that the decree was that the loss should be forever.

TEXT 10A

*The Rebbe, Rabbi
Menachem Mendel
Schneerson, Likutei
Sichot 7, pp. 15-16*

און וויבאלד אז מען ווייס ניט וואס ס'איז נגזר
געווארן אויפ'ן נגזל, איז דאך פארשטאנדיק, אז
דער גזלן האט ניט קיין שום רעכט ניט
אומצוקערן די גזילה דעם נגזל (אדער אפילו
אפלייגן די השבה אויף שפעטער) מיט דער
טענה, אז זיין אפהאלטן זיך פון השבת הגזילה
וועט באווייזן אז מלמעלה איז נגזר געווארן
אויפן נגזל ער זאל ליידן דעם היזק אויף
שטענדיק (אדער אויף א לענגערע צייט, ביז ער
וועט עס אים אומקערן) — (פונקט ווי ס'איז ניט
שייך צו זאגן, אז מ'זאל אימעצן מעגן מזיק זיין,
אדער מפסיד זיין ממונו, מיט דער טענה אז דאס
גופא וועט זיין א הוכחה אז אויף אים איז נגזר
געווארן צו ליידן א היזק).

Since we don't know exactly what the Divine decree on the victim is, it is clear that the thief has no right to refuse to return the money or delay. The thief cannot claim that their failure to return the money will indicate that G-d had decreed that the victim suffer permanent (or long-term) loss. This is the same as striking someone or causing them damage with the argument that this itself will prove that there was a Divine decree that the victim would suffer this damage.

The same logic applies to the *chomesh*: The thief's repayment shows that the victim wasn't meant to lose investment opportunities.



TEXT 10B

*The Rebbe, Rabbi
Menachem Mendel
Schneerson, ibid., p.
16*

איז אט דער זעלבער תירוץ אן
ענטפער אויך בנוגע צום חומש:
וויבאלד ס'איז פאראן א
מעגליכקייט, דורך צוגעבן אים א
חומש, אז ער זאל ניט ליידן קיין
שום הפסד פון דער גזילה (ער זאל
האבן ניט בלויז דעם קרן, נאר אויך
דעם חומש וועלכן ער וואלט
געקענט פארדינען אויב מ'וואלט ביי
אים ניט גע'גזל'ט), קען דאך זיין, אז
די גזירה צו מפסיד זיין דעם חומש
איז געווען בלויז ביז שעת ההשבה,
אבער ניט אויף שטענדיק.

This also answers our question about the added fifth. By paying the fifth, it is possible for the victim not to lose anything as a result of the theft. Not only will they not lose the principal, they will not even lose the added profit that they could have earned if the money had remained in their possession. It is therefore possible that the Divine decree that the victim would lose the potential profit was only until the time that the thief would return it, not forever.

ANSWER ON RASHI

Rashi's words, "to the rightful owner of the money," are not repetitive. They convey that the money always belonged to the victim, including any investment opportunities—explaining why the thief must also pay *chomesh*.

TEXT 10C

*The Rebbe, Rabbi
Menachem Mendel
Schneerson, ibid.*

און דאס זאגט רש"י "למי שהממון
שלו", מיינענדיק דערמיט (ניט בלויז
אז דעם חומש דארף מען געבן צום
נגזל, נאר אויך) מבאר זיין דעם טעם
דערפון: די הוכחה אז ס'איז נגזר
געווארן אז דאס געלט זאל צוגענומען
ווערן פון אים איז בלויז בנוגע דעם
עבר. בנוגע דעם עתיד אבער, דארף
מען עס באטראכטן אלס זיין
אייגענטום — "הממון שלו", און
דעריבער דארף מען אים צוגעבן א
חומש, בכדי צוריק צושטעלן אים זיין
פארמעגן בשלימות.

This is Rashi's intention with his words "to the rightful owner of the money." Rashi isn't just telling us that the added fifth needs to be given to the victim; he is also giving us the reason for this: We can only prove that there was a Divine decree that the victim would lose their money in the past. Regarding the future, we must consider it the victim's property and add a fifth in order to restore their property in the fullest way.



The Alter Rebbe's idea in Tanya aligns with modern cognitive therapies—your reaction to harm is your choice. The perpetrator is just G-d's tool.

TEXT 11

Gross, James J. "Emotion Regulation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward," *Emotion* 13, no. 3 (2013): 359–65.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032135>

We humans are nothing if not adaptive. This attribute depends, at least in part, on our ability to regulate responses to life's affective pushes and pulls. Emotion regulation allows us to adapt to these affective events—to keep cool under stress, emerge resilient from tribulations, and resist harmful temptations.

In order to understand how emotions are regulated, it is useful to first consider how they are generated. Theoretically, emotion generation can be understood as a process that unfolds over time. Emotions begin with the individual perceiving a stimulus within a context and attending to its features. Next, the individual appraises a stimulus's emotional significance, and this triggers an affective, physiological and behavioral response (Scherer et al. 2001; Barrett et al. 2007).

In this framework, the impact of any given emotion regulation strategy can be understood in terms of the stage of the emotion generation sequence that it impacts (Gross 1998). The best studied strategy is cognitive reappraisal, which targets the appraisal stage and involves changing one's interpretations or appraisals of the affective stimuli.

TEXT 11

Gross, James J. "Emotion Regulation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward," *Emotion* 13, no. 3 (2013): 359–65.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032135>

One reason this strategy is so well studied is because reappraisal is highly effective at regulating affect and physiological arousal without the cognitive and physiological costs associated with response-focused strategies (e.g., expressive suppression) (Gross 1998), and with longer lasting effects than attention-focused strategies (e.g., distraction) (Ochsner and Gross 2005; Kross and Ayduk 2008; Ochsner et al. 2012; Silvers et al. 2013).

But it is also well studied because the core elements of reappraisal are central to many forms of therapy, including cognitive behavioral therapy (Beck 2005), dialectical behavioral therapy (Lynch et al. 2007), and psychodynamic therapy (Bateman and Fonagy 2006; Maroda 2010; Have-de Labije and Neborsky 2012), all of which are effective for treating a variety of mood and anxiety disorders.

Life's challenges are inevitable, and blaming others is unproductive. Instead, focus on solving the problem, taking responsibility for your response, and moving forward.



TEXT 12

*The Rebbe, Rabbi
Menachem Mendel
Schneerson, Likutei
Sichot 7, p. 16*

דורך בעטן מחילה פארלייכטערט
מען, אין א געוויסער מאס, דעם
צער וואס מען האט יענעם
פארשאפן. ובמילא האט מען דאך
ניט קיין רעכט צו פארשאפן יענעם
א גרעסערן צער דורכן ניט בעטן
מחילה ביי אים — ווארום ס'איז
דאך ניט קיין הוכחה אז ס'איז נגזר
געווארן אויף אים צו ליידן א
גרויסן צער — און מ'איז מחוייב
צו טאן אלץ וואס מען קען אויף צו
פארגיטיקן דעם צער חבירו.

By asking for forgiveness, one
alleviates, to some extent, the
pain caused to another.
Consequently, one has no
right to intensify the pain
further by refusing to ask for
forgiveness. After all, there is
no proof that it was decreed
upon the other person to
suffer such significant anguish,
and one is obligated to do
everything possible to rectify
the harm caused to another.



While everything is ultimately from G-d, individuals still must take responsibility and make amends for the harm they cause.

KEY POINTS

1. The *asham gezeilot* (penitent thief's sacrifice) mandates full restitution plus a penalty to the victim.
2. The Torah's language stresses direct restitution to the victim, not intermediaries.
3. The extra payment compensates for lost investment potential. Even penalties must go to the victim, ensuring comprehensive repair of harm.
4. Victims are encouraged to view harm as part of G-d's plan to reduce resentment.
5. Perpetrators cannot use theology to absolve themselves of responsibility.
6. Making amends with the person you've hurt is a nonnegotiable obligation. G-d's justice does not excuse us from being a *mentsh*.

